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Resolving a Peculiar Paradox:
Uninsured Motorist Coverage Applied to
an Underinsured Tortfeasor
Ragsdale v. Armstrong'
I. INTRODUCTION
The language of uninsured motorist insurance contracts may create a gap
in coverage between the limits ofthe tortfeasor's liability coverage and the limits
ofthe uninsured motorist coverage contracf when the tortfeasor is from a state
with aMotor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) which has a lower
minimum limit of financial responsibility than that of Missouri? The gap is
created by policy language requiring that the tortfeasor have no insurance in
order for the uninsured motorist coverage to come into play.4 That gap may be
exacerbated due to the insured's right to "stack" uninsured motorist policies
when he or she has multiple vehicles insured.5 The result is a peculiar paradox:
the victim is better off if the tortfeasor had no insurance at all than if the
tortfeasor had coverage less than the coverage required by law.'
InRagsdalev. Armstrong,the Missouri Supreme Court attempted to resolve
this problem,7 but no proposed rule of law garnered a majority of the court's
support This Note reviews the various approaches to resolving the issue, and
proposes that a critical factor-the reasonable expectation of the consumer when
purchasing a policy of uninsured motorist coverage-has not been taken into
account.

1. 916 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1996).
2. 1 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE §

8.25 (2d ed. 1990).
3. The MVFRL in Missouri requires $25,000 per person and $50,000 per incident
coverage. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 303.025.2, 303.160.1, and 303.190.2(2) (1994).
4. 1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 8.25.
5. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544-45 (Mo. 1976).
Missouri Courts have required, as a matter of contract law, that uninsured motorist
policies be "stacked" so that the policyholder receives the benefit of multiple policies if
he or she has paid for multiple policies. Id at 544-45. For example, if a person with two
vehicles, each covered by an uninsured motorist policy of $100,000, is injured by an
uninsured motorist, the person is entitled to coverage under each policy, for a total
coverage of up to $200,000.
6. 1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 8.25.
7. 916 S.W.2d at 786 (Robertson, J., dissenting).

8. d at 784.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In November of 1990, Shelley Armstrong, a resident of the State of
Louisiana, caused an auto accident in which Missouri residents John and Donna
Ragsdale were injured.9 Armstrong had liability insurance coverage in the
amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident;' 0 the Ragsdales had
purchased from Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter) uninsured motorist
coverage in the amount of $100,000 on one vehicle and $50,000 on another."
The Ragsdales sued Armstrong and Shelter.' 2 Armstrong settled with Donna
Ragsdale for $7,500 and with John Ragsdale for the policy limit of $10,000;"
however, John Ragsdale's damages were in excess of $150,000.'
The
remaining issue for the court to resolve was whether, and to what extent, Shelter
was to be liable for John Ragsdale's injuries under the two uninsured motorist
policies the Ragsdales had purchased."5
The Boone County Circuit Court determined that, because she had coverage
less than that required by the Missouri MVFRL, Armstrong was an uninsured
motorist. 6 As a result of this finding, the court ruled that Shelter was liable on
each uninsured motorist policy to the extent of the policy limits, with an offset
in the amount of Armstrong's liability insurance settlement: an award of
$140,000.17 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.'8 The Supreme Court
granted transfer on Shelter's appeal. 9

9. Id (Benton, J., concurring).
10. Id Armstrong's policy was in compliance with Louisiana statutes, which
require that an "owner's policy of liability insurance ...[s]hall insure the person named
therein.., as follows: (a) Ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of
one person in any one accident, and, (b) Subject to said limit for one person, twenty
thousand dollars because ofbodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident." LA. REv. STAT. §32:900.B(2). Although the Louisiana statutes allow auto
policies to contain a provision increasing liability coverage to "meet the requirements of
the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of' other states in which the insured
travels, LA. REv. STAT. § 22:629 A(1), Armstrong's policy did not contain such a
provision. Telephone interview with Sidney Wheelan, paralegal in office of Ragsdale's
attorney, Rex Gump, Esq., March 12, 1997.
11. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 784 (Benton, J., concurring).
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id
17. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 784 (Benton, J., concurring).
18. Id
19. Id
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Shelter asserted that the trial court erred in two ways.20 First, Shelter
maintained that because Armstrong was not uninsured-merely
underinsured-the Ragsdales were entitled to recover on their uninsured
motorist coverage only to the extent required by public policyY Shelter argued
that the amount required by public policy was the minimum amount of liability
coverage mandated by state law ($25,000),2 less the offset provided by the
settlement with Armstrong, for a total award of $15,000.1 Second, Shelter
argued that the number of uninsured motorist policies it had sold to the
Ragsdales was irrelevant.e 24 "Stacking" of the policies should not have been
allowed because the award was not based on the uninsured motorist insurance
contracts purchased by the Ragsdales,2 but on public policy considerations
requiring only a total of $25,000 in coverage.26
The Missouri Supreme Court did not reach agreement on the issues in the
case.27 In apercuriam decision, the Court simply ordered that the trial court
decision be reversed, and judgment in favor of the Ragsdales in the amount of
$40,000 be enteredV Four judges supported reversing the trial court,29 and a

20. Iaeat 785.
21. Id
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.025.1 (1994) provides that "[n]o owner of a motor
vehicle registered in this state shall operate the vehicle... unless the owner maintains
the financial responsibility as required by this section." Mo. REV.STAT. § 303.025.2
(1994) states that "[a] motor vehicle owner shall maintain his financial responsibility...
with a motor vehicle liability policy which conforms to the requirements of the laws of
this state." Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190.2(2) (1994) declares that a'!motor vehicle liability
policy" will "insure the person named therein... against loss from liability imposed by
law for damages ... subject to limits... as follows: twenty-five thousand dollars
because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident...
23. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 785.
24. Id
25. Uninsured motorist insurance is required coverage as per Mo. REV. STAT. §
379.203.1 (1994), which states that "[n]o automobile liability insurance.., shall be
delivered... in this state unless coverage is provided therein.., in not less than the
limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection
ofpersons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators ofuninsured motor vehicles." Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.030.5 (1994) sets the
same minimum standards for uninsured motorist coverage as are provided for liability
coverage: "[Every such policy.., is subject, ifthe accident has resulted in bodily injury
or death, to a limit... of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily
injury to or death of one person in any one accident...
26. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 785.
27. Id at 783-84.
28. Id
29. Id at 783-85. Judges Price, Limbaugh, Covington, and Robertson supported
reversing the trial court. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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different combination of four judges supported the recovery by the Ragsdales of
"at least $40,000."'3
Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The disjointed decision in Ragsdalearose as a result of tension between the
public policy established by mandatory uninsured motorist coverage?' on the one
hand, and traditional contract law on the other? 2 The explosion in the number
of vehicles on the road after World War H and the resulting explosion of
accidents 3 led to increasing concern over problems created by financially
irresponsible motorists. 34 As a result, Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Laws (MVFRLs) were passed in all fifty states and the District of Columbia?s
The purpose of these laws is "to provide a prescribed level of minimum
protection for those who may be injured.., as a consequence ofthe negligent
operation of an insured vehicle."36 The requirement that drivers purchase
uninsured motorist insurance is a natural outgrowth of the failure of MVFRLs
to eliminate the problem of "financially irresponsible" drivers 37-- those who
drive without adequate insurance or financial resources to compensate victims
oftheir negligence3 8 'Forty-nine states have enacted laws which require either
that uninsured motorist coverage be offered in conjunction with auto liability
policies, or that uninsured motorist coverage beprovidedwith such policies 9
Missouri statutes require that such coverage be provided. °
Although the requirements vary among those states mandating uninsured
motorist coverage, any auto liability policy sold in a state with such a mandate
typically must include coverage "for the protection ofpersons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of

30. Id Judges Price, Benton, Holstein, and White supported an award of"at least
$40,000.1 Id
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1994).
32. .Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 786.
33. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 1.1.
34. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 1.1.
35. "Compulsory Automobile Insurance" Chart prepared by National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, 1992, updated 1993 (on file with Author). Thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have MVFRLs which require liability coverage and
twelve states have MVFRLs which are optional. Id.
36. 2 WIDISS,supranote 2, § 31.1.
37. 1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 1.1.
38. 1WiDISS,supra note 2, § 1.1.
39. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 2.5.
40. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/4
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uninsured motor vehicles.'' This coverage normally is required in the amount
of the statutory minimum for liability insurance mandated by the state's
MVFRL?2
Missouri statutes are typical of the statutes of those states requiring that
uninsured motorist coverage be provided.43 Specifically, the Missouri MVFRL
requires that "[a] motor vehicle owner shall maintain his financial
responsibility,"" and that "no person shall operate a motor vehicle owned by
another with the knowledge that the owner has not maintained financial
responsibility unless such person has financial responsibility which covers his
operation of the other's vehicle."4 The "vast majority" of people satisfy their
financial responsibility by purchasing an automobile liability insurance policy
"which conforms with the laws of the state."47 A liability policy "relates to the
use and operation of a particularly described motor vehicle.""
A "motor vehicle liability policy" is defined in Section 303.190, for
purposes of the Missouri MVFRL.Y' That section states that "as ... used in this
chapter,"" a motor vehicle liability policy will insure the person named in the
policy and any other person "using any such motor vehicle.., with the express
or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from liability imposed
by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
motor vehicle, as follows: twenty-five thousand dollars because ofbodily injury
to or death of one person in any one accident and ... fifty thousand dollars
because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons."'"
Missouri statutes further require that "[n]o automobile liability insurance
covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor
vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state.., unless coverage

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.2.
1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 2.12.
1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.2.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025.2 (1994).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.025.1 (1994).

46. 1 WiDiss,supranote2,§1.1; FirstNat'l Ins. Co. v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520,522
(Mo. 1995).
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025.2 (1994). Although an owner/operator of a motor
vehicle may provide a bond, Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.160.1(2) (1994), a certificate of
deposit, Mo. Ray. STAT. § 303.160.1(3) (1994), or a certificate of self insurance, Mo.
REV. STAT. § 303.160.1(4) (1994), as alternatives to purchasing automobile liability
insurance (as set out in Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.160 (1994)), for purposes of this Note,
only the insurance option will be discussed.
48. FirstNational, 899 S.W.2d at 522.
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.1 (1994).
50. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190.1 (1994).
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190.2(2) (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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is provided therein" for uninsured motorist protection.52 The amount of the
coverage is established by reference to Missouri's MVFRLS which provides for
minimum coverage of $25,000 per person, and $50,000 per accident5
Uninsured motorist policies, in contrast to liability policies, are related to insured
individuals rather than specific vehicles.- S
Uninsured motorist statutes are designed "to give persons who are injured
by financially irresponsible motorists the same protection they would have had
if they had been involved in an accident caused by a financially responsible
motorist ' In order to ensure broad coverage, the Missouri statutes specify that
coverage for "hit and run" accidents be provided as part of the uninsured
motorist coverage,5 7 that such coverage apply even if no "physical contact was
made between the uninsured motor vehicle and the insured or the insured's
motor vehicle,"5" and that a vehicle shall be deemed to be "uninsured" even if a
policy covers the vehicle when the insurer issuing that policy is insolvent. 9
Missouri courts have held,e° and consistently maintained,6 ' that an owner
of uninsured motorist insurance covering multiple vehicles is entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage for each vehicle for which coverage is purchased. 62
Such multiple coverage is typically referred to as "stacking."' Specifically, the
court in CameronMutualInsurance Co. v. Madden held "that the public policy
expressed in § 379.203 prohibits the insurer from limiting an insured to only one

52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203(1) (1994).
53. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203(1) (1994).
54. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.030.5 (1994).

55. FirstNat'l Ins. Co. v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. 1995).
56. Cook v. Pedigo, 714 S.W.2d 949,953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994) provides that coverage "exists although the
identity ofthe owner or operator or the motor vehicle cannot be established because such
owner or operator and the motor vehicle departed the scene....
58. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994).
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203.2 (1994).
60. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544-45 (Mo. 1976).
61. See, e.g., Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Bergtholdtv. Farmers Ins. Co., 691 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Maxon v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Tegtmeyer v. Snellen, 791

S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
62. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544-5.
63. 12A GEORGEJ. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIAOFINSURANCELAW § 45.628 (2d
ed. 1981). The term "stacking" may also encompass combining multiple policies of other
types of coverage (i.e.
liability policies) or different types of coverage (i.e. liability with
uninsured or medical pay coverage). Not all types of stacking are allowed by Missouri
courts. In the context of this Note, stacking will refer only to that involving uninsured

motorist coverage.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/4
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of the uninsured motorist coverages provided by" the insurer." "An insured
under uninsured motorist coverage is entitled by the statute to the... protection
that he purchases and for which he pays premiums. It is useless and meaningless
and uneconomic to pay for... insurance and simultaneously have this coverage
canceled by an insurer's exclusion."5 As such, the victim of a negligent,
uninsured driver in Missouri is entitled to stack coverage for multiple uninsured
motorist policies ifnecessary to compensate him or her for losses. This allows
such victims to recover more than the statutory minimum of the MVFRL by
operation of law.6'
Thus, the Missouri legislature generally requires that any motor vehicle
operated in the state carry with it liability coverage for negligent actions of its
driver.6 When a driver violates the MVFRL by driving a vehicle without
insurance (or a statutorily acceptable alternative), protection normally is
provided to an injured individual by the uninsured motorist coverage
requirements set out in section 379.203. 9 This coverage must be provided with
any automobile liability insurance issued or delivered in the state. 0
Despite these provisions, gaps in the statutory scheme remain. 1 Initially,
uninsured motorist coverage could be obtained almost solely in the amount of
the minimum requirements of the various states' MVFRLs 2 This resulted in a
peculiar paradox: consumers could purchase liability policies (which protected
others) with limits of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but were unable to
protect themselves (and their families) from uninsured motorists in an amount
greater than the minimum state requirements? 3 In the late 1960s and the 1970s
many states required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage policies with
higher limits. 4 Eventually, most companies voluntarily offered such coverage
in all states, effectively eliminating this problem. 5

64. Cameron,533 S.W.2d at 543-44.
65. Id at 543 (quoting Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238
(Fla. 1973)).
66. Cameron,533 S.W.2d at 544-45.
67. Id.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.025.2 (1994). Exceptions include those instances in
which the driver was not aware of the lack of insurance on a vehicle he or she was
borrowing with permission, Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.025.1 (1994), and in which a driver
used another's vehicle without permission, Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190.1(2) (1994).
69. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994).
70. Id
71. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994).
72. 2 WIDIss, supranote 2, § 31.4, n.11.
73. 2 Id § 31.4.
74. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 8.25.
75. lId
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Higher limit uninsured motorist coverage creates another problem-a
peculiar paradox which still exists today: when a driver insured with some
liability insurance causes an accident with an individual who has uninsured
motorist coverage with a limit higher than the driver's liability coverage, and
damages exceed the liability coverage, the uninsured motorist coverage for
which the victim has paid is not effective because the tortfeasor is not
uninsured. 76 As a result, the harmed party would actually be better off if the
tortfeasor had no insurance than if he or she had some liability coverage. 7 This
situation caused many states to require that underinsured motorist coverage be
available, 8 and many insurers then began to provide such coverage in states
where it was not mandatory.7 9 Underinsured motorist coverage, either in
conjunction with or to supplement uninsured motorist coverage, 0 is designed to
provide coverage "for accidents involving insured motorists with liability
coverages that were not sufficient to 8provide complete compensation for
claimants who were entitled to recover."'
Although many states mandate that underinsured motorist coverage be
offered or provided,82 Missouri is not among them.' However, Missouri
insurers typically make such coverage available: each ofthe ten companies with
the largest market shares--together representing over two-thirds of the
marketS-sells underinsured motorist coverage. In the case of each company,
underinsured motorist coverage must be purchased as a rider to
liability/uninsured motorist coverage. 7

76. lId
77. 2 WIDiSS, supranote 2, § 31.3.
78. 2Id § 31.5.
79. 2Id § 31.6.
80. 2Id § 31.5.
81. 2Id § 31.4.
82. 2Id § 32.4. "Sevbral states in New England-including Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont-have adopted legislation that makes underinsured motorist
coverage mandatory." Id. (emphasis added). "In most of the states, the underinsured
motorist insurance legislation requires that the coverage be 'made available' or 'offered'
to insurance purchasers." Id. (emphasis added). One should distinguish between the
mandatory offering of coverage and the coverage being available upon request. In the
latter case, there is no requirement that the consumer be made aware of such coverage.

Id
83. No Missouri statute or regulation imposes such a requirement.
84. Missouri Department ofInsurance, 1995 MissouriMarket Share Report, May
1996, at 64.
85. Id
86. Memorandum from Silver Graham, Property & Casualty Specialist 11, Missouri
Department of Insurance, to the Author (Jan. 1997) (on file with Author).
87. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/4
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The definitions of specific uninsured motorist policy terms have been left
largely to the discretion of the insurance industry."8 As a result, the terms of
policies often have been narrowed to the extent that they conflict with the public
policy behind uninsured motorist coverage. 9 One example of such narrow
policy terms is the definition of "uninsured motorist" or "uninsured motor
vehicle" in policiesf 0 This definitional problem is the issue presented in
Ragsdale: Does a tortfesor who has liability insurance in an amount less than
that required by a state's MVFRL qualify as an uninsured motorist for purposes
of uninsured motorist coverage? 91
Prior to Ragsdale, Missouri courts had split on the issue. In Brake v. MFA.
Mutual Insurance Co., the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District,
determined that it "could not in good conscience hold that 'uninsured' includes
'underinsured."'I The tortfeasor in Brake had liability insurance which
complied with the Missouri MVFRL 3 The accident caused by the tortfeasor
injured twenty-one persons, however, and the limits on the policy were paid
without compensating Brake in the minimum amount required by the MVFRL
for an individual, despite the fact that her loss exceeded that minimum. 9 The
Brake court found that the public policy enunciated by the General Assembly in
Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1994) was that "every insured ... is entitled under
the uninsured motorist coverage to payment of the damages which she could
have recovered had the tortfeasor maintained a policy of liability insurance in a
sum sufficient to respond in damages to the extent of the . . . statutory
minimum."91 The court held that "[t]he term 'uninsured motor vehicle' as used
in § 379.203, par. 1 ... [is] not ambiguous .... .'Un' means not. An uninsured
vehicle is one which is not insured!' The court stated that "[n]o exception was
made by the General Assembly for the protection of an injured party where
multiple claims reduce his participation in the proceeds of the tort-feasor's
policy.' ' The court went on to point out that a situation in which "a tortfeasor's policy is issued in an amount less than the limits prescribed by [the state
MVFRL]" is another example of a situation in which the "general public policy
of the Uninsured Motorist Law may be frustrated but for which the General

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.3.
lId
1Id. § 2.11
Ragsdale v. Armstrong, 916 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Mo. 1996).
Brake v. WFA Mut. Ins. Co., 525 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
Id at 110.
Id
Id
Idat I11.
Id at 112.
Brake, 525 S.W.2d at 113.
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Assembly has made no provision. ' * This was the case despite the "anomalous
result' that the injured party would be better off if the tortfeasor had no
insurance than if he or she had some coverage. 1°°
Eleven years later, the Missouri Court ofAppeals, Eastern District, reversed
direction in Cookv. Pedigo.' In Cook, the tortfeasor carried liability insurance
in an amount less than that required by the Missouri MVFRL.un The court
determined that "[t]he Brake court's assertion that an underinsured motorist

cannot qualify as an uninsured motorist under §379.203.1 went far beyond the
particular factual situation before the court ....

That assertion thus clearly

constitutes obiter dictum."'" The court asserted that "[n]o other reported
Missouri decision has considered whether an underinsured automobile-that is
one that is covered by liability insurance, but in an amount less than the statutory
minimum-may be an uninsured motor vehicle."0 °
The court then analyzed Mo. REV. STAT. §379.203 and the public policy
it represents:
This provision demonstrates the legislature's intention to allow any insured
motorist who is injured by a negligent and financially irresponsible motorist
to recover at least the statutory minimum amount. This legislative intent
would be thwarted by a rule that precluded a claimant from recovering under
his uninsured motorist protection because the tortfeasor carried less than the
statutory minimum amount of insurance. We conclude, therefore, that an
underinsured motorist should be considered an uninsured motorist... for
purposes ofMissouri's uninsured motorist protection statute, §379.203.1.11s
The court labeled the assertion made in Brake-that "uninsured" meant
only those situations in which no insurance existed-as being a "narrow and
cramped construction of the statutory language."' The court went on to hold
that, due to the public policy set out in the statute, a victim may recover under
his uninsured motorist coverage if the tortfeasor is underinsured, although the
recovery is to be "limited to the difference between the tortfeasor's liability
°
insurance and the minimum liability requirements under the [MVFRL]."1
Courts in other states which have addressed the issue have uniformly
determined that where the legislature has passed an uninsured motorist coverage

99. Id
100. Id
101. Cook v. Pedigo, 714 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

102. Id at 950.
103. Id at951.
104. Id
105. Id at 952.

106. Cook, 714 S.W.2d at 952.
107. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/4

10

19971

Bixby: Bixby:MOTORIST
Resolving a Peculiar
Paradox:
COVERAGE
UNINSURED

statute, the motorist with coverage less than that required by the state's MVFRL
should be viewed as uninsured despite contract language to the contrary? °s One
approach used to overcome such contrary language in uninsured motorist
insurance contracts is to rely on "the public policy underlying the uninsured
motorist statutes[:] that an insured person should be assured at least the
minimum amount of compensation which is provided for by the state's
[MVFRL]"' For example, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
held:
[lihe legislative purpose behind the [New York uninsured motorist insurance
requirement] is to protect persons who are injured by financially irresponsible
motorists from the financial burden this lack of coverage might impose. The
statute is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purpose of
affording a person injured in an accident involving an uninsured driver the
same protection that he would have if he had been involved in an accident
caused by an automobile covered by a standard New York State automobile
liability insurance policy." 0
However, because the court superseded contract language due to the public
policy of the uninsured motorist statute, it was willing to do so only "[t]o the
extent that the respondent's recovery from the [tortfeasor is] ... less than...
[the MVFRL] minimum limits.""'
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the Rhode
Island General Assembly "has require[d] insurance carriers authorized to do
business in the state to provide protection against the negligent operation of
uninsured automobiles in favor ofthose motorists who ... contract with licensed

108. Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Uninsuredand UnderinsuredMotoristCoverage:
Recoverability, Under Uninsuredor UnderinsuredMotoristCoverage, ofDeficiencies
in CompensationAffordedInjuredPartyby Torfeasor'sLiability Coverage,24 A.L.R.
4th 13, 19 n.10 (1983) ("Although no case has been found denying recovery under an
uninsured motorist policy when the tortfeasor carried some liability insurance, but with
limits less than the statutory minimum, the reader's attention is directed to Brake v. MFA
Mut. Ins. Co:). For a discussion of Brake, see supratext accompanying notes 92-100.
A Michigan court did hold that a tortfeasor whose coverage was less than the
Michigan MVFRL was not uninsured for purposes of uninsured motorist insurance
coverage. St. Bernard v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 350 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Mich. CL
App. 1984). However, its decision was based upon the legislature's repeal of the
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage statute as part ofthe implementation of a no-fhult
auto insurance scheme. 1 WIDISS, supra note 2, § 8.21. Michigan is the only state not
to require uninsured motorist coverage or an offer of coverage. 1 WmIss, supranote 2,
§1.1.
109. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 8.21.
110. Neals v. Alltate Ins. Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316-17 (App. Div. 1970).
111. Id at317.
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carriers for liability coverage in the interests of the public generally."" 2 The
court then interpreted the intent of the legislature to be that the definition of an
uninsured automobile must as a matter of public policy be construed to include
a vehicle with liability insurance in an amount less than that required by the
MVFRL, and that uninsured motorist coverage should "be construed to include
any differential between liability insurance carried by the tort feasor and the
'
minimum limits mandated by the legislature." 0
A second approach used to overcome language in uninsured motorist
insurance contracts has been to use a legislative definition of uninsured vehicle
to invoke coverage under the uninsured motorist policy.114 Although California
courts have not addressed the identical issue raised in Ragsdale,"- it appears that
this approach does not limit recovery to the minimum established by the
MVFRL." 6 The California District Court ofAppeals, First District, determined
that "the declared legislative andjudicial policy ofthis state is to give monetary
protection to those who, lawfully using the highways, suffer injury through
negligent use of the highways by others.""" The court reviewed two provisions
of the California uninsured motorist laws which were "in obvious conflict."" s
The first provision required uninsured motorist coverage in the amounts
specified by the MVFRL;" 9 the second provision defined uninsured motor
vehicle as a vehicle which had no liability insurance coverage." The court then
resolved the conflict "by construing the second provision to define as uninsured
a vehicle carrying insurance... in limits less than the financial responsibility
requirements of the Vehicle Code.'' Therefore, any vehicle carrying less than
the minimum required by the MVFRL is to be construed as uninsured, and "[t]he
statutory scheme contemplates that once the uninsured motorist coverage comes
into play,
the injured insured has resort to the full coverage for which he has
paid!"'n
Like the California courts, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
"once an insured becomes liable on its uninsured motorist coverage, the insured

112. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447,450 (RI. 1966).
113. Id at450-51.
114. Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 63, 64 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
115. Neither Taylor, nor any other California case, involved an insured whose
uninsured motorist coverage exceeded the MVFRL minimum.
116. Taylor,37 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id. at 63-64.
120. Id at 64.
121. Id
122. Kirkley v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 427,429 (Ct. App. 1971).
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will receive the difference between the amount of his damages or the [uninsured
motorist policy limits] .... whichever is the lesser, and the tort-feasor's liability
coverage."'"
The New Hampshire Court relied on an explicit statutory
definition (rather than the California Court's constructive definition) of
"uninsured motorist" in which the statute states that a motorist is to be
considered uninsured if he or she carries liability insurance with limits lower
than the New Hampshire MVFRL. 24 Reasoning that "[w]hen an insured
purchases additional coverage, he reasonably expects to be protected against
uninsured motorists up to the amount for which he paid,'121 the court concluded
that "once a victim is injured by a motorist who falls within the definition of an
uninsured motorist, the proper figure to which one should look to determine
maximum recovery is the amount of coverage purchased."' 26
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Ragsdale, the Missouri Supreme Court split into four factions, ranging
from a strict contract interpretation of no recovery' 2 to recovery to the full extent

of policy limits, including stacking the Ragsdales' two uninsured motorist
policies." Theper curtian decision relied on different combinations of these
opinions to reach the two prongs of its result: overturning the trial court
decision, and awarding $40,000 in damages. 129 As shown in the chart below,
each result was reached in a 4-3 decision.'
Judge

Overturn

Award of(at least)S40,000

Trial Judge
Price

Yes

Yes

Benton (joined by Holstein and White)

No

Yes

Limbaugh (joined by Covington)

Yes

No

Robertson

Yes

No

123. Vigneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 382 A.2d 910, 913 (N.H. 1978).
124. Id at 913-14.
125. Id. at914.
126. Id
127. Ragsdalev. Armstrong, 916 S.W.2d 783, 785-86 (Mo. 1996) (Limbaugh, J.,
dissenting).
128. Id. at 785 (Benton, J, concurring). An offset for Armstrong's liability
insurance carrier's contribution was to be allowed in the amount of $10,000.
129. Id at 783-84.
130. Id.
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Each of the four opinions recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that
under a strict construction of the terms of the contract, no coverage would be
afforded John Ragsdale under the uninsured motorist policies.'' The various
opinions differed, however, on whether and why uninsured motorist coverage
should be allowed the Ragsdales, and what the extent of the coverage should
32

be.1

.4. The Robertson Opinion
Judge Robertson argued that the uninsured motorist contract language
should be superseded in order to "indulge the fiction, demanded by the public
policy set out in the statutes, that Armstrong [the tortfeasor] was uninsured [but]
only to the extent that her liability coverage did not meet Missouri statutory
minimums." 33 This position would result in Ragsdale receiving a recovery of
$25,00013 --the amount established by the state MVFRL.'" This rationale and
result are consistent with those of New York and Rhode Island cases, supra.
B. The Benton Opinion
Judge Benton's opinion took the second approach discussed in Section III
above: it attempted to use a statutory definition in its interpretation of the
contract in order to resolve the issue. 6 Although Missouri statutes do not define
"uninsured motor vehicle,"'' Judge Benton found that the Ragsdales' uninsured
motorist policy defined an uninsured motor vehicle as one which does not have
a bodily injury liability insurance policy. 3 Judge Benton then looked to the
statutes to find a definition of such a policy,"3 and he found that the statutes
define a "motor vehicle liability policy" as one which provides the minimum
amount of coverage under the MVFRL.'10 Since Armstrong's policy did not fit

131. Id. at784-86.
132. Id
133. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 786 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
134. Id Ragsdale would receive $10,000 from Armstrong's liability insurer and
the balance from his uninsured motorist coverage. Id
135. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.2(2) (1994).
136. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 784-85 (Benton, J., concurring).
137. Id at 786 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 784 (Benton, J., concurring) ("The Ragsdales' insurance policy defines
'uninsuredmotor vehicle' as "a motor vehicle not insured by a bodily injury liability
... insurance policy.") (emphasis in original).

139. Id. at 784-85 (Benton, J., concurring).
140. Id at 785 (Benton, J., concurring). The term used in the Ragsdales' policies
was "bodily injury liability... insurance policy," whereas the term used in the statute
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/4
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the statutory definition of a motor vehicle liability policy, Judge Benton
concluded that, by the terms of the Shelter uninsured motorist contract,
Armstrong was uninsured. 4' John Ragsdale then was entitled to recover under
the terms of his contracts, including stacking his uninsured motorist policies,
although Shelter should be entitled to an offset in the amount of Armstrong's
liability coverage. 142 This rationale and result are similar to those reached in the
California and New Hampshire cases discussed above.'43
C. The Limbaugh Opinion
Judge Limbaugh's opinion, to use the words of Judge Robertson, "ignore[d]
the public policy ofthe state relating to uninsured motorist coverage."'"4 Judge
Limbaugh found that the analysis should begin and end with the contract
language,14 and that the contract language was clear: "The words 'not insured'
necessarily refer to a person not protected by liability insurance. Because the
Armstrong vehicle was insured by a liability insurance policy at the time of the
accident, the Ragsdales should not be able to invoke the uninsured motorist
coverage! ' This opinion does not appear to have support from any similar
law,1 47 and goes further than even
case in a state with an uninsured motorist
48
Shelter argued the court should go.
D. The PriceOpinion
Judge Price agreed with the Robertson opinion in regard to the public policy
argument allowing recovery to the extent of the statutory minimum of the
MVFRL," but he insisted that it was appropriate to do so for each uninsured

was "Motor Vehicle Liability Policy." Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190 (1994). The
discrepancy between the terms is not addressed by the opinion. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d
at 784-85 (Benton, L, concurring).
141. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 785 (Benton, L, concurring).
.142. Id The total recovery would then be $150,000: $10,000 from Armstrong's
liability carrier, and $140,000 from the Ragsdales' uninsured motorist coverage. The
total recovery would be equal to the coverage limits under the Ragsdales' two uninsured
motorist policies. Id
143. Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 63, 63-64 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Vigneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 382 A.2d 910, 914 (N.H. 1978).
144. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 786 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
145. Id (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
146. Id at 785 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
147. See Russ, supranote 108, at 19 n.10.
148. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 785.
149. Id at 784 (Price, J., concurring).
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motorist policy purchased by the Ragsdales, based on the state's stacking
policy. 5 0 This result would award John Ragsdale a total of $50,000: $10,000
to be paid by Armstrong's liability carrier, and the balance to be paid by Shelter
under the Ragsdales' two uninsured motorist policies.''
V. COMMENT
The net result of the court's opinion in Ragsdale is less than satisfying.
Although it would appear that a victim may collect on his or her uninsured
motorist coverage when a negligent driver with a liability policy which has limits
less than required by the MVFRL causes damages in excess of his or her
coverage, the extent to which such recovery may be made and the rationale for
such recovery are not clear.
The Limbaugh opinion is clearly out of step with the mainstream judicial
response to the issue'5 as well as the public policy set out in the statute. 153 This
interpretation would seem to be a "narrow and cramped construction of the
statutory language" indeed."5 The Price opinion relies on the public policy
espoused by the uninsured motorist insurance requirement s of ensuring
minimum coverage of $25,000 on the one hand, and the court approved policy
favoring stacking' 6 on the other. 57 However, the result advocated by Judge
Price would appear to be incompatible with these two policies in that once the
public policy goal of providing $25,000 in coverage has been attained, either
stacking should not come into play at all (as per the Robertson opinion5' ), or the
rationale behind stacking-that "[a]n insured ...

is entitled. .. to the...

protection that he purchases and for which he pays premiums"' 59-- would seem
to require coverage to the extent of the policy limits for each policy purchased
(as per the Benton opinion)."6

150. Id For a discussion of stacking, see supratext accompanying notes 60-67.
151. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 784 (Price, J., concurring). Although the Price result
is identical to that oftheper curiam decision, it is not the holding of the court per se. Id
at 783-84.
152. See Russ, supranote 108, at 19 n.10.
153. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 786 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
154. Cook v. Pedigo, 714 S.W.2d 949,952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
155. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (1994).
156. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544-45 (Mo. 1976).
157. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 784.

158. Id at 786-87.
159. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 543 (quoting Tucker v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 288 So. 2d 238,242 (Fla. 1973)).
160. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 785.
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Although the Benton opinion also has its weaknesses, it is closer to the
mark. Its reliance on a statutory definition to interpret the contract is a
reasonable approach to developing a resolution. However, as Judge Robertson
suggested, Judge Benton "scour[edlthe-Shelter insurance policy for words that
permit the Court to find Shelter intended to invoke the statutory definition of a
'motor vehicle insurance policy."' " 61 Unlike New Hampshire, where the
legislature explicitly defined the term "uninsured motor vehicle,"'6 2 or even
California, where the courts relied on a constructive expansion of the definition
of'ninsured motor vehicle" found in statute," the Benton opinion had to go
a step firther.' Judge Benton relied on Shelter's definition of "uninsured motor
vehicle,'*" but seized upon that definition's use of the term "bodily injury
liability... insurance policy"'' " as being sufficiently similar to the statutory
term "motor vehicle liability policy" as to use the statutory definition of the latter
for the definition of the former. 67 Furthermore, as pointed out in both the
Limbaugh and Robertson opinions, the statutory definition of "motor vehicle
liability policy" "applies only to the provisions of Chapter 303, the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law... [and not to] the contents of uninsured
motorist [contract] provisions."' 168
The most sound of the opinions appears to be that of Judge Robertson. He
forged a compromise between the public policy of the state uninsured motorist
statutes on the one hand, and the policy language of the uninsured motorist
contract entered into by the Ragsdales and Shelter on the other. 6 9 However,
Judge Robertson himself labelled the compromise "rough justice at best."'170
This is so because an important aspect of the case was not raised. Specifically,
"it is interesting to speculate what the court would have done had the claimant's
argument been predicated on alleged ambiguity in the parties' contract arising
from conflict between the definition of the uninsured vehicle and the
expectations of a reasonable person purchasing uninsured motorist coverage" in
7
excess of the minimum required by the MVFRL.' '

161. Id at 786.
162. Vigneault, 382 A.2d at 914.
163. Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 63, 64 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
164. Ragsdale,916 S.W.2d at 784-85 (Benton, J., concurring).
165. Id at784.
166. Id (Emphasis in original).
167. d at 785.
168. Id See Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190.1 (1994) ("A 'motor vehicle liability
policy' as saidterm is used in this chapter shall mean .... .") (emphasis added).
169. Mo.REv. STAT. §303.190.1 (1994).
170. Ragsdale, 916 S.W.2d at 787.
171. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 8.25.
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As stated in Section HI above, a lack of underinsured motorist coverage
creates a peculiar paradox: a person with uninsured motorist coverage limits of
$50,000 per person will be better off if involved in an accident with a person
with no insurance than in an accident with a person covered by the statutory
minimum." Although a consumer certainly may choose such a peculiar result,
one must wonder if a choice is actually being consciously made, or if it is being
made by default through ignorance of the paradox created by the gap in
coverage.17

In the absence of an offer of underinsured motorist coverage, an argument
can be made that the decision to purchase coverage with such a gap is based on
a lack of understanding of how the coverage works. Furthermore, one might
argue that, under the "reasonable expectations doctrine," the insurer should be
held to the reasonable expectations of the consumer.17 4 The reasonable
expectations doctrine "provides [that] the objective reasonable expectations of
adherents ... to insurance contracts will be honored even though a thorough
study of the policy provisions would have negated these expectations."' 75
Although the Missouri Supreme Court limited the use of the reasonable
expectations doctrine, 7 those limitations do not prohibit the use of the doctrine
inRagsdale.17 In applying the doctrine, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Westem
District, stated that "a term of a non-negotiated insurance policy, or other

172. Id
173. For example, underinsured motorist coverage in the Jefferson City, Missouri
area is offered, for as little as $6per year for limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000
per incident, by one of the ten insurers with the largest market share in the state.
Memorandum from Silver Graham, Property & Casualty Specialist II, Missouri
Department of Insurance, to the Author (Jan. 1997) (on file with Author).
174. Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413,426 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
175. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Sere., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982).
176. Id at 697-98. The Missouri Supreme Court held in Robin that the reasonable
expectation "argument is predicated upon the existence of an adhesion contract between
[plaintiff] and the insurers." Id at 697. Furthermore, the Supreme Court suggested that
the use of the reasonable expectation doctrine might be limited to situations in which 'he
negotiations regarding [the insurance policies] were between the individual insured and
the insurer"-in contrast to the insured's employer and the insurer, as was the case in
Robin. Id
177. Neither of the limitations set out by the Supreme Court would affect the
Ragsdales' case. The contract between the Ragsdales and Shelter, with no third party
intervening, was a classic contract ofadhesion-a "[s]tandardized contract form offered
to onsumers ... on an essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording consumer
realistic opportunity to bargain," BLACK's LAW DICTiONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990). The
contract was between the Ragsdales and Shelter, with no third party intervening.
Ragsdale, 91'6 S.W.2d at 784.
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standard contract, which does not meet reasonable expectations of the great
7
majority of adherents is unfair and so subject to the judicial power to correct."'
In a second case1 79 decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western
District, the court determined that an expectation of an insured may be "totally
reasonable despite policy language that points toward [a contrary result]. ' lso
"The principle of reasonable expectations insures that '[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of
'
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."""
In a third Western District case involving a consumer's reasonable
expectations, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the owner of uninsured
motorist policies would reasonably expect that his minor children would be
covered by the policies,"2 and that they should be covered"n despite the fact that
"[t]he terms of the insurance policy are unambiguous in limiting those who are
entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverage to the policyholder and his
spouse.""'
Professor Widiss has concluded that the policyholder in a situation like that
ofthe Ragsdales would reasonably expect to be protected by his or her uninsured
motorist coverage:
[When a purchaser has specifically sought excess [higher limit uninsured
motorist] coverage for which the company charged a separate premium, it
seems justified to conclude that by requesting the coverage and paying an
extra premium for uninsured motorist coverage above the minimum amount
set by the state's financial responsibility laws, the typical purchaser has either
actual or reasonable expectations that the higher limit uninsured motorist
coverage will provide indemnification for injuries caused either by an
uninsured motorist or by someone carrying liability insurance with lower
limits." 5
If the Ragsdales had, in fact,understood the gap in coverage created by the
contract language, it seems very unlikely that they-or the "great majority of

178. Estrin,612 S.W.2d at 426.
179. Tegtmeyer v. Snellen, 791 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
180. Id at 740.
181. Id (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW, at 351
(1971)).
182. Husch By Husch v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 772 S.W.2d 692, 694-95
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
183. Id at 694.
184. Id at 693.
185. 1 WIDISS, supranote 2, § 8.25.
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adherents!'' 8 to uninsured motorist policies similarly situated-would have been
willing to pay extra premiums to protect themselves (and their families) from an
uninsured motorist with coverage in excess of the MVFRL minimum, yet refuse
to spend a comparable, 87 small'88 amount of money to protect themselves (and
their families) from underinsured motorists. 8 9 In short, the gap in coverage
created by the contractual distinction between an uninsured and underinsured
motorist does not appear to be a reasonable expectation ofthe "great majority of
adherents' 9 to an uninsured motorist insurance contract, and, therefore, should
be "subject to the judicial power to correct."''
THoMAs D. BIXBY

186. Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 426 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
187. The premium for an uninsured motorist policy with limits of $50,000 per
person and $100,000 per accident in the Jefferson City, Missouri area range from $10 to
$21.20 among the top ten carriers. Memorandun'from Silver Graham, Property &
Casualty Specialist II,Missouri Department of Insurance, to the Author (Jan. 1997) (on
file with Author). The premium for underinsured coverage with the same limits and
location ranges from $5 to $17.70. Id
188. The premium for underinsured coverage quoted in footnote 187 would seem
to be a minimal amount in contrast to the annual premium for liability, comprehensive,
or collision coverage which can easily run into hundreds of dollars per year.
189. The Author is the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs for the
Missouri Department of Insurance, and has oversight ofpersonnel responding to nearly
6,000 consumer complaints and over 70,000 consumer inquiries relating to insurance
matters annually. Based on this experience, the Author does not believe that most
consumers have an understanding of how uninsured and underinsured coverage would
work in a situation such as that presented in Ragsdale.
190. Estrin, 612 S.W.2d at 426.
191. Id
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